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Abstract
This article focuses on the translation of the 
French and English law enforcement models into 
Argentina and analyzes its consequences in terms 
of social order. Whereas in the former two models 
the judiciary and police institutions originated in 
large-scale processes of historical consolidation, in 
the latter these institutions were implanted with-
out the antecedents present in their countries of 
origin. The empirical references are Argentine 
police institutions, particularly the police of the 
Buenos Aires Province, observed at two moments 
in which the institutional import was particularly 
intense: towards the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth centuries, and at the 
end of the twentieth century. By way of tracing 
these processes of police constitution and reform, 
we show how new models of law enforcement and 
policing interacted with indigenous political struc-
tures and cultural frames, as well as how this 
constellation produced a social order in which 
legality and illegality are closely interwoven. The 
article is an attempt to go beyond the common 
observations regarding how an imported model 
failed; instead, it dissects the effects the translation 
actually produced and how the translated models 
transform into resources that reshape the new 
social order. A crucial element, the article shows, 
is that these resources can be instrumentalized 
according to »idiosyncrasies«, interests, and quotas 
of power.
Keywords: institutional import, police, politics, 
social order, Argentina
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Introduction
The notion of plural normative orders usually 
refers to the coexistence or interaction of different 
systems of norms in any geographical space defined 
by the boundaries of a nation state. Normative 
orders that differ from the official legal system (i. e., 
state law) are recognized as such – and not simply 
outlawed – due to their legitimacy, expressed as 
being an accepted way of guiding behavior and 
social expectation within a given community or 
social group. For the purpose of the argument 
presented in this article, it is worth stressing that 
those who represent these coexisting normative 
orders make public claims about their validity. The 
resulting social order, therefore, contains publicly
recognized procedures and mechanisms aimed at 
the coordination and adaptation of the normative 
orders mentioned.
This article presents a different case of norma-
tive pluralism. In what follows we present the case 
of a plural normative order in which the normative 
order that differs from the official legal system is 
legitimate, in the sense that it is a socially accepted 
way of guiding behavior, but is not – and cannot be 
– publicly recognized. More specifically, this article 
describes a social order created by the interaction 
of the official legal system and a well-rooted in-
formal and illegal system of norms. Although we 
do not use the term »corruption«, the phenome-
non at stake could also be described as a social or-
der in which the legal system interacts with gener-
alized state corruption. In the language of the so-
called informal institutions, those understood as 
»socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are 
created, communicated, and enforced outside offi-
cially sanctioned channels«,1 this article deals with 
a type of informal institution which »structures 
incentives in ways that are incompatible with the 
formal rules: to follow one rule, actors must violate 
another«.2 We do not assign the same moral value 
to both normative orders; however, we do try to 
capture the relevance of informal and illegal sets of 
norms as socially accepted ways of guiding behav-
ior, producing justifications, and expecting future 
events, because it unavoidably affects the workings 
of the official normative order. In short, this article 
dissects the history of a social order composed of 
both an official system of norms and a system of 
norms that is illegal but socially accepted.
It is contended that this particular type of social 
order is not an isolated case of institutional cor-
ruption, but the result of the translation or import 
of law enforcement models from »central« coun-
tries into a »peripheral« one. Whereas in the 
former the judiciary and police institutions origi-
nated in large-scale processes of historical consol-
idation, in the latter these institutions were im-
planted without the antecedents present in their 
countries of origin. The empirical references are 
Argentine police institutions, particularly the po-
lice of the Buenos Aires Province, observed in two 
moments in which the institutional import was 
particularly intense. The first moment coincides 
with the first phase of globalization, towards the 
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth century. This period saw the creation 
and consolidation of the Argentine Federal Police 
and, in consequence, of the police of the Buenos 
Aires Province.The second moment coincides with 
the second phase of globalization towards the end 
of the twentieth century, as political authorities, 
interested in turning to a model that would over-
come the recognized shortcomings of the previous 
model, tried to reform the Buenos Aires Province 
Police.
By way of tracing these processes of constitution 
and reform of the Buenos Aires Province Police, we 
1 Helmke / Levitsky (2006) 5;
see Lauth (2000).
2 Helmke / Levitsky (2006) 15.
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show how new models of law enforcement and 
policing interacted with indigenous political struc-
tures and cultural frames, and how this constella-
tion produces a social order in which legality and 
illegality are closely interwoven. The article, there-
fore, is an attempt to go beyond the common 
observations regarding how an imported model 
failed, instead dissecting the effects the translation 
actually produced. We observe the effects of the 
»cultural translation« of such normative orders and 
pay attention both to different concrete practices 
stemming from this translation and to the new 
meanings imparted to the traditions of the new 
social environment. As we inquire into these pro-
cesses, we are able to observe how different legal 
orders compete and how social actors, collective 
and individual, are either conditioned by them or 
succeed in instrumentalizing them for their own 
interests.
Though this study reveals processes and circum-
stances that cannot be generalized, nevertheless it 
has a heuristic value: it illuminates further research 
aimed at capturing homologous processes in other 
social contexts. As noted when we formulated the 
concept of »clusters of order«,3 the hybridization 
of traditionally mutually exclusive spheres – of the 
legal and the illegal – functions as the foundation 
of the social order in many social contexts, and this 
can also be observed in the case presented. In this 
way, the case reveals how the interplay between 
different models of law enforcement, which came 
into contact with one another due to globalization, 
leads to the constitution of diverse types of legal 
and social order. This perspective, therefore, at-
tempts to see beyond the classic view that the 
import of a model implies its exact translation into 
the new context, suggesting instead the idea that 
this translation implies the introduction of a set of 
resources.The crucial element is that these resourc-
es can be instrumentalized according to »idiosyn-
crasies«, interests, and quotas of power. These 
resources intervene and play a major, though not 
determinative, role in the constitution of the social 
and legal order.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next 
section we introduce a characterization of the 
different models of law enforcement developed 
in central countries, before showing how they were 
»translated« into the Argentine social context in 
the aforementioned two instances. Following this, 
we discuss the concept of the cluster of order as an 
instrument for interpreting processes such as those 
that took place in Argentina. Here we compare the 
ways in which the problem has been analyzed and 
highlight the advantages introduced by the per-
spective presented in this article. In the final sec-
tion, we show how this perspective contributes to 
a novel understanding of the globalization of 
normative orders, especially helping to overcome 
socio- and ethnocentric views of the problem at 
stake.
Two Models of Policing and
Their Evolution
From the very beginning, the formation of the 
Argentine police, including the force responsible 
for the province of Buenos Aires, was influenced by 
two models in tension. The first originated in 
France and the second in the United Kingdom, 
although the latter was further developed in the 
United States, where a number of particularities 
came to be incorporated into the model. It is worth 
emphasizing that the models orienting the forma-
tion process of the Argentine police were not 
consistent. As we will show, the models were 
different and even opposed in some cases. In the 
Argentine case, the hybridization resulted from 
efforts aimed at solving the practical problems 
generated by one model by using the potential 
advantages of the other.
The French model that was originally intro-
duced in Argentina also experienced a dual begin-
ning. In principle, the enforcement of the law at 
the hands of police organizations was conceived in 
the seventeenth century in order for the absolutist 
state to consolidate its power. It was a centralized 
model with a strong militarist bias, whose purpose 
was to strengthen territorial unity by promoting a 
universal norm enforced by a central power.
However, as a consequence of the emergence of 
more populous cities and the resulting formation 
of a new urban class during the Napoleonic Re-
forms, the police incorporated a key function: to 
control and order the urban space. In that sense, in 
addition to the task of fighting crime, the police 
assumed an ordering and moralizing function, 
3 Dewey / Míguez / Saín (2017).
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especially in relation to problems such as the 
circulation of people and transport, overcrowded 
housing and hygiene in the cities. Thus, in spite of 
the mutation from a macro-political to a micro-
political function, in both cases the police was a 
centralized institution operating »over« civil soci-
ety, controlling it and performing a civilizing role.4
Contrary to the French model, the formation of 
the British police was inspired by the liberal ideals 
that developed from the seventeenth century on-
wards. It was a police force created with the 
intention of promoting security throughout the 
territory as well as ensuring the prosperity and 
well-being of its inhabitants. Thus, although the 
police force was created with the obvious task of 
combating crime, this particular goal was actually 
embedded in another, more general aim: the me-
diation of everyday conflicts and the promotion of 
a social order that would facilitate economic ex-
change and commerce.5
Seen from this perspective, this model of polic-
ing sought, in addition to controlling and disci-
plining citizens, the constitution of a police power 
based on civil society consents and oriented toward 
their reproduction. However, when this model was 
imported into the United States, the context re-
quired that it was only partially adopted. Tensions 
in specific spheres of American society, particularly 
those related to issues of race, made it difficult for 
the police to withdraw from the conflicts affecting 
the population. Thus, broadly speaking, the Amer-
ican police tended not to intervene in everyday 
conflicts as an instance of regulation and pacifica-
tion, but tended to act as an interested party, 
operating as a disciplinary force upon the weak 
sectors of society (i.e., the more disadvantaged 
ethnic groups).6
As already pointed out, unlike in Europe or the 
United States, the French and Anglo-Saxon models 
employed in Argentina did not operate independ-
ently, but constantly alternated with one another 
in successive police reforms, of which the main aim 
was to overcome the shortcomings and difficulties 
present in the Argentine police. However, it is 
worth mentioning that such alternation was not 
a planned introduction of features of the two 
models. In the next section, the paper shows that 
the successive police reforms were a juxtaposition 
of partially different models that resulted in a sort 
of institutional palimpsest containing its own par-
ticular dynamics, tensions and emerging features.
The Formation of the Buenos Aires
Police Force
The formation of more or less professionalized 
police services in Argentina, and particularly in the 
Buenos Aires Province, is the result of a long 
process which began during the consolidation of 
the national state in the second half of the nine-
teenth century, and ended with the emergence of 
Peronism in the mid-twentieth century.7 Before 
this period, policing in Argentina was the task of 
rural militias, commonly staffed by agents with 
dubious legal records that operated inorganically, 
controlling rural banditry and political dissidents, 
as well as committing fraud, if necessary.8 From 
1880 onwards, a process of centralization and 
professionalization took place among the police 
of the Buenos Aires Province.The legislative passed 
a law in 1880 that created the police force of the 
province, and in 1890 the Reglamento General de 
Policía was enacted.
During its formation process, the police of the 
Buenos Aires Province originally adopted the 
French model, and the beginning was character-
ized by an attempt to organize the heterogeneous 
mosaic of provincial militias into a unified force. 
The police force was assigned the function of 
promoting the consolidation of the administrative 
power at the national level and the control of the 
emerging urban class.The latter were characterized 
by a double origin. On the one hand, they were 
marginal sectors of the rural world that migrated 
to urban centers; they settled in the suburbs and 
combined both rural and urban economic activ-
ities. On the other hand, towards the end of the 
nineteenth century and until the 1929 financial 
crisis, mass migration from Europe meant that a 
significant new actor became the subject of police 
surveillance, because new habits and political ideas 
4 Berlière (1996).
5 Salvatore (2010).
6 Emsley (1983).
7 Barreneche (2010).
8 Miller (1986).
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of the »migrants«. Thus, similar to the French 
model, the goal behind the professionalization of 
the police force was to consolidate the power of the 
national state and to extend it at the provincial 
level with a civilizatory spirit. In doing so, the 
expected result was a police force that promoted 
a new moral and civic order among immigrants 
and in traditionally rural sectors.9 As Kalmano-
wiecki10 asserted, the police became an organiza-
tion with a military ethos that attributed to itself 
heroic ideals associated with the creation of the 
nation and took a negative view of democracy, 
which they saw as a regime that complicated the 
control of the emerging marginal actors – rural 
bandits, peasants, people practicing undesirable 
occupations (mal entretenidos) and other actors 
with similar stigma attached to them.
However, these attributions and self-perceptions 
of the police provoked constant problems of legiti-
macy. Because of its commitment to a disciplinar-
ian role in society, the police force was perceived as 
a power external to society and was rejected espe-
cially by the poor. »Police and no more [y basta]«11
was a common negative expression that clearly 
suggested the widespread feelings«. The problems 
posed by a police force lacking enough legitimacy 
did not go unnoticed, above all for the political 
groups that, towards the beginning of the twenti-
eth century, tried to represent the emerging middle 
class sectors, as did the Partido Radical under the 
leadership of Yrigoyen.This led to a redefinition of 
the role of the police and to the incorporation of an 
ideal closer to that of the Anglo-Saxon model. Such 
redefinition implied an attempt to increase profes-
sionalism and to replace the patriotic and military 
ethos with an ideal of the police as an organization 
of public servants, functional to the democratic 
order, and willing to »understand« the everyday 
troubles of the working class.12
However, these police professionalization pro-
grams were introduced in a context replete with 
tensions that, in the end, provoked significant 
variations in the way such programs were imple-
mented. As we will see, the first policies aimed at 
centralizing administration and exerting social 
control came into conflict with political structures 
at the local level, where local police forces colluded 
with public servants. They informally governed 
connections to illegal businesses such as prostitu-
tion and gambling, not only for their own personal 
benefit, but also to provide a source of resources for 
supporting official functions carried out by police 
agencies. At the same time, this collusion led to the 
deployment of actions and tactics, usually carried 
out by the police, aimed at controlling and harass-
ing the political opposition in favor of local cau-
dillos. This illegal function of the police – which 
continued throughout the twentieth century and 
usually targeted emerging social segments politi-
cally opposed to governments – clashed with the 
model that sought to legitimize police work by 
way of stressing the role of police officers as public 
servants. Significant events that took place at the 
beginning of the twentieth century show that as 
the role of police forces was being redefined, a 
tendency emerged simultaneously in which disci-
plinary actions increasingly targeted disadvantaged 
segments of society.
A clear example of this contradiction is the 
bloody repression carried out by the Yrigoyen 
government in 1919. However, this tendency crit-
ically deepened following the coup d'état that 
overthrew Yrigoyen and replaced him with Alvear 
in 1930. In the period between the coup d'état and 
Peron’s rise to power in 1945, a series of conserva-
tive governments came into power by way of 
electoral fraud, a practice in which the police forces 
were very much involved. During this period, the 
tensions created by the juxtaposition of the two 
models of policing became evident. The attempts 
to professionalize and administratively centralize 
the police organization remained, but, at the same 
time, large portions of the political structure rested 
on the ongoing police intervention in politics, a 
»service« that consisted of controlling the political 
opposition and organizing electoral fraud.
This political role, supported by collusion with 
local political leaders or the protection they pro-
vided, resulted in a situation in which each local 
police station developed a great deal of autonomy 
from the central power. The difficulties the central 
administration had in financing the police, espe-
9 Galeano (2007) 115.
10 Kalmanowiecki (1998) 305.
11 Kalmanowiecki (1998).
12 Kalmanowiecki (1998) 309, (2000).
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cially in distant locations, and problems regarding 
access to accurate information, supported these 
robust colluded relationships between the police 
and local powers.13 Although the central admin-
istration was able to provide funds for salaries, the 
availability of resources for important everyday 
policing tasks (transport, supplies, repairs, etc.) 
depended on funds provided by local political 
administrations. Moreover, the central administra-
tion had poor access to information about hiring 
and promotions, which meant a strong depend-
ence on local politicians who constantly influenced 
the new appointments. Thus, each jurisdiction 
within the province developed a great autonomy 
and shadow relationships with the local political 
power, while the central administration was un-
stable and unsuccessful regarding the implementa-
tion of long-term policies that would transcend 
everyday problems.
Research conducted by Barreneche14 about the 
obstacles blocking attempts to reform the police 
institution clearly illustrates that the real and con-
crete model of law enforcement resulted from such 
complex combinations and contextual elements. 
During the reforms introduced by the central 
administration after 1936, under the supervision 
of the then Chief of Police, Pedro L. Ganduglia, 
local political leaders and police officers’ fierce 
resistance to the professionalization of the police 
became evident. One of the first efforts was to 
revise pre-existing appointments, as well as to 
introduce new requirements for accessing the po-
lice force. Ganduglia, for example, suspended all 
police officers until their specific functions could 
be established; prohibited police officers from 
visiting the administration offices with the aim of 
limiting peddling; and assigned police inspectors 
the task of gathering information about the func-
tioning of each police station of which they were in 
charge. Additionally, the »police of investigations« 
was created and charged with the task of control-
ling the work of local police organizations. One of 
the most important goals of this new force was to 
supervise the tolerance shown toward illegal prac-
tices like gambling and prostitution. However, this 
supervision could only be partially implemented 
since, at least to a certain extent, the funds the 
police collected from these illegal activities were 
used for the everyday workings of the local police.
An additional element of Ganduglia’s reform 
was the control of the administration of funds and 
the gathering of information about the appoint-
ment of staff in each police station in the province. 
The goal was twofold: On the one hand, to check 
the actual destination of funds provided by the 
central administration, since in many cases funds 
allocated for maintaining and purchasing weapons 
and ammunition were diverted toward different 
purposes. Probably, one of the most polemic ele-
ments of the reform was the requirement, intro-
duced in order for the authorities to be able to 
monitor the illegal enrichment of police officers, to 
submit a »Sworn Declaration of Property«. On the 
other hand, the goal of the administrative control 
was to check if the staff appointed in the province 
fulfilled the basic requirements for working as 
police officers. This was necessary due to the com-
mon practice of appointing individuals with crim-
inal records or people who did not actually work 
for the police, but for local caudillos instead.
As we mentioned above, these attempts to re-
form the police faced several obstacles, which in 
the end prevented the materialization of the 
changes introduced. For example, the difficulties 
in accessing information could not be easily over-
come, a problem that, in practice, strongly inter-
fered in the adoption of higher standards. Incor-
porations and promotions continued to depend on 
local politicians’ recommendations, even when the 
appointments were ratified by the central admin-
istration. An additional example relates to the 
preliminary administrative proceedings, which 
were subject to an attempt made by the central 
administration to limit their production at a local 
level. In the provincial parliament, the political 
opposition, including members of the Conserva-
tive Party, were united in their reaction to this 
change, which would basically take away from 
them the administration of sanctions and inves-
tigations.This, again, showed that large parts of the 
structure of power rested on the possibility to 
control the local police.
13 Zimmermann (2007); Zimmermann 
(1998).
14 Barreneche (2007a); Barreneche
(2007b).
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Nevertheless, in spite of the aforementioned 
attempts, the interest in using the police as an 
instrument for harassing the political opposition – 
an objective still shared then by the central political 
authorities and the local branches of the party – 
persisted. In fact, during the period in which the 
reforms took place, the governor of the Buenos 
Aires Province declared his mission to be the 
»repression of communism« and gave the police a 
central role in this task.15 This function was con-
nected with the pre-existing idea that the police 
should play a central role in the control of margin-
al populations and the repression of crime. Hence, 
the attempts to change the way the police operated 
were hampered by a strong dependency on polit-
ical authorities: despite all good intentions, the 
interest held by the official party in controlling the 
political opposition was still present, as were the 
links with the local powers who were interested in 
»governing« or »administrating« the crime instead 
of »fighting« it.
In sum, the result of the constitution process of 
the provincial police was a force whose design was 
based on two models in tension; it was designated 
to fulfill contradictory functions; and it was built 
on an institutional structure with its own tradi-
tions. While the police were in charge of regulating 
the common issues of everyday life and unifying 
the territory, the same police had to perform the 
role of disciplining society, harassing political op-
position, and moralizing to the subaltern – func-
tions that stand in open contradiction with the first 
purposes mentioned. At the same time, the struc-
ture of institutional power rested on illegal prac-
tices resulting from the collusion between public 
servants and police officers: both illegally adminis-
trated crime instead of repressing it, and thus 
created a source of resources for financing political, 
as well as police, activities. This constellation of 
power relationships made clear that, more than 
being a contradiction between the legal and the 
illegal, both were complementary. During the 
Peronist government (1946–1955), following the 
phase of reforms, the models in tension were 
consolidated. Initially, different policies introduced 
by the Peronist government tried to strengthen the 
power of the central police administration, the 
main purpose of which was to dismantle networks 
of local power that favored the Conservative Party. 
This implied a certain autonomization and milita-
rization of the way the police was organized and 
led to increasing independence from the political 
power. However, this coexisted with the aspiration 
of the Peronist party to assign the police with a role 
clearly oriented towards social assistance.16 More-
over, using their own connections at a local level, 
the new political authorities aimed to restructure 
the links between the police and the local political 
powers. In the end, during the Peronist adminis-
tration, instead of such ties being broken up, the 
original model of policing was consolidated.
After the first two terms of government under 
Peron, the recurrence of dictatorship terms doubt-
less deepened the interdependence between the 
police force and the political authorities, as well 
as accentuated the military and repressive ethos. 
However, it was during the dictatorship period 
(1976–1983) that the collusion mentioned gained 
new momentum. The concentration of power in 
the hands of security forces allowed them a level of 
autonomy and impunity that not only reached its 
zenith, but also provided a new impulse to the 
illegal extraction of resources. Emblematic prac-
tices such as kidnapping, also aimed at financing 
political activities, and the extermination of polit-
ical opponents was carried out together with com-
mon economic crimes, including the appropria-
tion of abductees’ properties.17 These crimes un-
doubtedly indicate a further deepening of the 
aforementioned collusion. Whereas police forces 
traditionally participated in the administration of 
»crimes without victims«, such as prostitution and 
gambling, the military dictatorship introduced a 
set of new practices, the most emblematic of which 
being the direct execution of violent crimes, such 
as kidnapping and robberies.
Once democracy was re-established in 1983, 
new attempts were made to reform the police, 
and their main purpose was to subordinate police 
power to the civil authorities, as well as to eradicate 
the use of repressive and criminal practices by 
police forces. A detailed description of these at-
15 Barreneche (2010).
16 Isla / Míguez (2011), Pereira /
Ungar (2004).
17 Barreneche (2007b).
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tempts fall outside the scope of this article; how-
ever, in the following section we focus on the 
reform implemented at the end of the ‘90s. We 
show that in this new phase of globalization, the 
import of law enforcement models was once again 
strongly conditioned by indigenous traditions and 
local institutional arrangements.
New Wine into Old Wineskins: The Zero-
tolerance Policy of the ‘90s
As already mentioned, in the years after the 
reestablishment of democracy that took place in 
1983, a series of attempts were made to reform the 
police institution: subordinating it under civil con-
trol, redefining its military and repressive ethos, 
and stressing the role of the police as an agent that 
regulates conflicts in society. However, even when 
these aims were present in discourses and projects 
in Congress, reforming the police was never a 
central concern for politicians under the first 
democratic governments, probably due to the fact 
that »public security« was not a central concern in 
society. Around the mid-90’s, however, this con-
stellation underwent a drastic change. During the 
second term of the Menem administration, crime 
rates increased significantly and public opinion 
deemed public security to be an urgent problem, 
leading to its swift entry into the political agenda. 
Hence, attention was shifted towards the police of 
the Buenos Aires Province, an institution whose 
staff was usually involved in crime – unsurpris-
ingly, the same crimes as those common during the 
dictatorship: robbery and the kidnap of business 
people.18
These attempts at reform were not isolated from 
international tendencies. One of the most impor-
tant initiatives for reforming the Buenos Aires 
Province Police in 1998 included the introduction 
of »zero-tolerance« policies, which were popular as 
a crime-reduction strategy in New York.19 The 
zero-tolerance model implied the strict control of 
all kinds of law-breaking behaviors. In other 
words, by promoting civic conduct that viewed 
transgressions with extreme severity, the model 
aimed at a rapid reduction in crime. This policy 
was associated with the introduction of technology 
into the fight against crime, including the produc-
tion of maps indicating the locations of crimes and 
crime hotspots, as well as the rigorous observation 
of efficiency in each police station and the ongoing 
measurement of the evolution of crime. Moreover, 
these new methods for quantifying and mapping 
police activity were associated with a system of 
rewards and sanctions, according to which the 
more effective units were rewarded with additional 
resources. This system also implied a strict control 
of every form of police misbehavior or corruption, 
including all kinds of collusion with outlaws.
The introduction of this model of police man-
agement in Buenos Aires implied a fusion of 
traditions and long-term patterns inscribed in the 
»cop culture« of the police of the province. From 
the very beginning, the idea of a »strict control« of 
crime was associated with militarized traditions 
that had been an integral part of the police ethos 
since its constitution a century ago and which had 
been further strengthened under the dictatorship. 
The policy of zero-tolerance thus stimulated tradi-
tional repressive practices that included torture 
and homicide as resources for fighting crime. The 
evolution of the rate of minors killed in confron-
tations with the police clearly illustrates the con-
sequences of such a policy: between 1996 and 2002 
the rate of minors killed increased by 232 %.20 It is 
worth mentioning that many »confrontations« 
between police officers and young criminals were 
not the result of officers combating criminals law-
fully, but the consequence of disputes related to 
illegal business. In other words, many instances 
involving the torture and/or homicide of minors 
were the outcome of settling scores between police 
officers participating in illegal business and young-
sters recruited by the officers themselves to commit 
crimes. For this reason, the model of zero-tolerance 
did not work as an effective inhibitor of crime, but 
instead became a legitimating mechanism for ille-
gal police practices: violent and criminally minded 
police officers suddenly received additional leeway 
for acting illegally.
Although police institutions played a promi-
nent role in this new scenario, they were not alone 
in the extra-legal governance of crime. As we could 
observe throughout the entire history of the police 
in Argentina, this illegal governance was the result 
18 Saín (2004); Saín (2008); Camou /
Moreno (2005).
19 Pereira / Ungar (2004); Fuentes
(2005); Eaton (2008).
20 Isla / Míguez (2011).
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of the collusion of many actors within the political 
system, as well as high-ranked public servants such 
as ministers and mayors. Such collusion between 
police officers and criminals, as we have already 
mentioned, originated in the fact that both actors – 
the police institution and politicians – benefited 
from the illegal collection of resources. That is, 
even when the resources gathered through the 
illegal participation in crimes usually ended up in 
private pockets (corruption in the traditional 
sense), the resources were also used for the financ-
ing of normal police activities and the political 
system.
The market for stolen auto parts in the Buenos 
Aires Province provides us with a clear example of 
the way in which crime, police, and politics are 
interwoven.21 In an interview with Marcelo Saín, 
Deputy Security Minister of the Buenos Aires 
Province, he told us the following: »How do you 
think the police finance an intelligence investiga-
tion? Let’s say they’re following drug traffickers. 
You need a car, to fill it with gas, perhaps spend 
some nights in a hotel, to eat something, the 
equipment, etc. … well, there’s no budget for that. 
For that, there is caja [illegally earned money]«. 
Saín, who in 2003 was part of the government 
responsible for introducing a significant police 
reform, explained that the money collected by 
police from actors operating in the market for 
stolen auto parts is not only funneled toward 
private purposes; public functions are also funded, 
such as repainting police stations, or topping up 
the meagre pensions of retired officers. Former 
Supreme Court justice Eugenio Zaffaroni gives a 
similar account of the situation.
It is traditional […] that police agencies’ budg-
ets are large but that salaries and expenditures 
for operative matters are neglected. This is the 
result of corporative, vertical and authoritarian 
organizations in which decisions are imposed 
from the upper echelons and any discussion 
about the allocation of resources is absent. As 
a consequence, this lack of resources needs to be 
compensated with an illegal collection of re-
sources carried out by police officers. To a great 
extent, the benefits of the so-called subterranean 
criminal system are meant to complement the 
state budget. This leads to the paradox that the 
crime prevention agency is funded by criminal 
acts. (Zaffaroni as cited by Saín 2008, 160).
The Internal Affairs Unit (Asuntos Internos) 
keeps official records relating to the funding of 
the police. These records state that materials neces-
sary for carrying out ordinary police duties – paper 
on which to print citizens’ complaints, gas to fuel 
the cars intended to pursue or transport criminals – 
are usually funded by resources collected in illegal 
markets such as that for stolen auto parts. Extra 
funds are obtained through the common illegal 
practice of budget inflation, in which police staff
at all levels of the organization exaggerate, for 
example, monthly gas consumption, a practice 
corroborated by both Saín and Carlos, a super-
vision sfficer. Saín and Carlos were in agreement 
that the purpose of the collected money was often 
to bolster salaries or cover a range of minor ex-
penses in police stations.
As well as helping to fund normal policing 
activities, monies collected from car-lifters and 
dismantlers in the market for illegal auto parts also 
go toward political campaigns. Eaton describes 
how mayors take the opportunity to »derive sub-
stantial funds from the illicit conduct of police 
officers, funds that are useful in hard-fought and 
increasingly expensive political campaigns«.22 Car-
los, the supervision officer, explained that »during 
campaign times there is an increase in crime 
because the police let the rackets do their work. 
Letting their businesses run is a means for politi-
cians to raise money during campaign times.« 
These phases, he said, were characterized by »a 
decrease in drug seizures; there is a need to sell. 
The deal for the mayor is to win money that is then 
passed on to the chief officer. And it is also meant 
for other things.« Informal arrangements such as 
these reveal a long-standing pattern of institutional 
behavior in which both the police and political 
actors are implicated. All indicators mentioned by 
the interviewees – the resources collected, strict 
norms, rules governing how business is to be 
conducted, a code of silence among police officers 
– point to the existence of informal institutions 
21 Dewey (2012).
22 Eaton (2008) 19.
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that function smoothly in order that police hier-
archies are reinforced and political careers can be 
funded.
Defining the Emerging Social Order
The case presented above suggests, at least in 
principle, something relatively evident: the trans-
lation of an institutional model into another social 
context does not mean that the effects observed in 
the source context will be the same at the destina-
tion. Of course, variations are associated with 
differences in the indigenous institutional tradi-
tions and to the availability of actual resources in 
the same context. In that sense, the case described 
in this article confirms, but also contests, the argu-
ment about the significant difficulties related to 
state formation in Argentina and in other similar 
cases.
As, for example, Peter Waldmann23 asserted, 
one key problem that occurred during the process 
of translating law enforcement models originating 
in European or North American contexts into 
South America is that the translation required 
legislation far beyond the real possibilities of the 
indigenous state agencies. In other words, the 
lack of available resources did not allowed public 
agencies to guarantee effective law enforcement 
throughout the entire territory. This situation not 
only impeded an actual and universal enforce-
ment; it also had a twofold effect. On the one 
hand, the law was administered in a discretional 
manner and conditional to balances of power and 
reciprocity ties among the actors involved. On the 
other hand, it affected the legitimacy of the law, 
since the arbitrary enforcement of the law created a 
generalized distrust in society regarding the impar-
tiality of the authorities in charge of enforcing the 
law.
However, a limitation of this perspective is the 
analysis of the consequences of the translation in 
terms of the negative. The effects of the translation 
are assessed taking into account only the limita-
tions, or what the legal model has not achieved, 
and excluding what the translation actually gener-
ated. On the contrary, a perspective centered on all 
normative orders that give shape to the actual 
social order needs to circumvent the idea according 
to which legality and illegality are – in real life – 
mutually exclusive dimensions. As shown in the 
previous sections, the resources introduced by a 
»failed« model are recycled and used for the pro-
duction of a new order. For example, the distinc-
tion between legal and illegal practices served as a 
resource for a selective enforcement of the law, the 
capture of resources, and their reintroduction into 
both the police and the political system.
In other publications, we have used »clusters of 
order« to describe the social order resulting from 
how the new institutional models translated into 
the new context interact with indigenous tradi-
tions and balances of power.These clusters of order 
emerge in spaces in which the state’s formal means 
of social domination face considerable opposition; 
nevertheless, the state is still found to be informally 
and/or illegally present. Goods and services in 
these spaces are thus provided as a consequence 
of legal and extra-legal actors interacting with one 
another. This, in turn, leads to the formation of a 
regime of domination characterized by the inter-
connection of patrimonialistic and rational bu-
reaucratic principles.
Thus, it is possible to affirm that areas in which 
the domination of the state’s rational institutions is 
contested do not necessarily demonstrate a com-
plete lack of some form of domination or that no 
authority exists. When legal and extra-legal actors, 
private companies and public agencies, or local and 
foreign actors form alliances that are subject to 
two different but inextricably linked sets of rules – 
one formal, one informal – an interdependence is 
evident that builds the exact momentum needed to 
generate the relevant economic resources, author-
ity and social order.
It is useful to consider Erdmann and Engel’s 
definition of neo-patrimonial rule here: »a mixture 
of two co-existing, partly interwoven, types of 
domination: namely, patrimonial and legal-ration-
al bureaucratic domination«.24 The prevailing 
forms of domination in the clusters under inves-
tigation are patrimonial, and relations between 
rulers and ruled are, therefore, based not on im-
personal social norms or laws, but on interpersonal 
ties and alliances. In this environment, there is an 
awareness of the existing formal laws and bureau-
23 Waldmann (2002).
24 Erdmann / Engel (2007) 105.
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cratic and rational administrative principles, but 
there is a lack of adherence to them in practice.The 
vital element is the fact that legal-rational rules in 
the context of particularistic power relationships 
are able to generate new possibilities for action. 
Even more crucially, this scenario also generates 
additional room for the selective enforcement of 
the law, which we demonstrated in the case of the 
Buenos Aires Province Police. This last factor car-
ries great weight: as is the case in legal orders, norm 
enforcement instances are required in order to 
regulate the internal coordination of clusters of 
order, a task that may be carried out by state actors 
acting informally, particularly in the case that some 
practices are met with social acceptance and pos-
itive externalities are produced.25 Within such 
contexts, various kinds of actors have »a certain 
degree of choice as to which logic they want to 
employ to achieve their goals and best realize their 
interests«.26 This leads us to conclude that the 
cultural layers that form the basis of the authority 
and domination within a cluster of order are 
characterized by ambiguity. Actors participating 
in these clusters need not lean toward one form 
of domination or the other (rational or patrimo-
nial). Where there is no preference for either form, 
such principles may be combined according to 
circumstantial conditions.
Conclusion
This article presented a case of normative plural-
ism in which the normative order that differs from 
the official legal system is legitimate, in the sense 
that it is a socially accepted way of guiding behav-
ior, but cannot be publicly recognized as such. The 
main feature of the alternative system of norms is 
that structures incentives that directly contradict 
official norms and lacks formal legitimacy. Despite 
this, however, the unofficial normative order is 
stimulated by state and political actors and the 
result of a historical dynamic in which the import 
of law enforcement models plays a major role.
From the point of view of the translation of 
normative models, the case presented here con-
firms the intuitive prediction: the translation of the 
model does not assure the same effects in its new 
contexts. However, the article makes clear that in 
order for us to better understand normative orders; 
we need to transcend approaches centered only on 
the deviation from the translated model. In this 
article, we show how the translated model trans-
forms into resources that reshape the new social 
order. More specifically, the emerging social order 
results from the interplay between translated in-
stitutional models and indigenous balances of 
power.
Nevertheless, the relativism introduced by the 
notion of clusters of order should also be con-
trolled. It is also true that alternative forms of order 
may optimize – or not – processes of cooperation 
and foster trust in public authorities. The case 
presented suggests that, in comparison with the 
ideal normative model, the levels of cooperation 
and trust are lower, and this might stimulate a 
continuous search for new models that overcome 
the shortcoming of the previous one.
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